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Rejoinder – Clamour of Nationalism Symposium 
 
Journal: ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 
 
It is easier to denounce than affirm.  
 
It is this unsettling truism that pithily captures why today’s nationalism remains 
such a generative but in equal measure defeatist object to write through. For the 
Clamour of Nationalism (CoN) to be treated to such exactingly kind commentary 
as provided by the four symposium contributors (Bangstad, Bhattacharyya, 
Favell, and Papadakis) is certainly gratifying, if also humbling. But it is indeed 
this above tension as pressed in the contributions that speaks with a distinctive 
urgency, and all the more so given the sobering electoral result witnessed in 
Britain over the interim period. This is namely a trap that faces any account of 
nationalism – whereby, an emphatic account of its polyglot allure that reaches 
across the ideological spectrum precludes in turn any credible gesture at how 
the present might actually escape the clutches of nation-thinking and its 
attendant racial demons. Indeed, a reckoning with how and why nationalism has 
reasserted itself at the center of today’s political culture does even risk a certain 
seduction, wherein the ability of nationalism to monopolize the terrain of 
political community exhausts the possibility of any alternative. Put differently, 
notwithstanding the vainglory of any such statement, I would venture that the 
putative virtues of Clamour of Nationalism are simultaneously its dangers – an 
analytic staging of contemporary nationalism’s fully revitalized power is also to 
submit to its inevitability vis-à-vis modernity.   
 
As regards the symposium, it is Bhattacharyya who most overtly issues the 
above consideration, when reflecting that ‘what I fear is that nationalism is 
easier to denounce than to shake off’ (p. 1); also noting elsewhere ‘that it is 
easier to know what we are against than what we are for’ (p. 7). But this remains 
a general anxiety that organizes, to varying extents, all four commentators. And 
whilst they all share a certain resignation to the suffocating ubiquity of 
nationalism, also vital is their implicit call to continue to reckon with the 
contradictions and therein also the openings that live amidst the nationalist 
closure. As has been a hallmark of most thinkers who endure, not least the 
tradition of Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy I am most mostly closely acquainted with, 
it is the serious task of affirmation that is equally central to the task of critical 
theory. To settle for the comforts of critical flourish is to forego the terms by 
which life is already rendered worthwhile and/or bearable. And it is to remain 
unmoved by those currents in the minor key that continue to offer registers by 
which to forge alternative majorities. Similarly, as opposed to taking only refuge 
in the courage of fringe resistances, vital as they of course are, it is across the 
always-sullied terrain of the already-popular that the possibility of alternative 
majorities must also be staked.  
 
It is accordingly this overarching problem of ‘nationalist defeatism’ that I will 
center in this ‘rejoinder’. This necessarily results in many of the contributions’ 
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other themes being omitted. This omission includes their careful reaffirmation of 
my own centering of race to the story of today’s Western nationalisms. It 
includes their largely complementary theorization of the different ideological 
traditions that service nationalism’s contemporary preeminence, with Bangstad 
and Papadakis reserving particular invective for the broader traps of left 
nationalism, a timely critique given the reheated call for ‘progressive patriotism’ 
being currently sounded in Britain. And it includes their attentiveness to the 
geographical reach of my approach, but also, therein, the possible geographical 
limits – Favell (p. 2) is particularly insistent about these limits, though he might 
be attributing far too much exceptionalism to the UK here, unexpectedly playing 
into one of the more prized maxims of ‘Our Island Story’ British myopia. Some of 
the contexts mentioned by the contributors extend, after all, from the North of 
England, to Hong Kong, to a generic Europe; particularly affirming for me 
however, given my Scandinavian background, is Bangstad’s deft transposing of 
the book’s argument to contemporary Norway. 
 
Collectives beyond nationalism 
 
A common tension identified in the commentary concerns the need for a fuller 
engagement of debates about populism, warts and all. Bangstad and 
Bhattacharyya prove particularly insightful here, spying in my argument an 
underworked position on the populist possibility. And whilst largely agreeing 
with my recurring contention that it is the ascription of nationalism and not 
populism that better captures the current political moment, they both raise here 
intriguing questions about what a left-oriented theorization of populism might 
look like.  
 
Bangstad is rightly surprised by the book’s only rather passing reckoning with 
the attempt by Mouffe and her successors to rehabilitate populism. He himself, 
much like Fassin (2020) in his hotly discussed Populism Left and Right, does 
remain suspicious of Mouffe’s general thesis, and particularly her attempt to 
weave Hall into her argument. But despite this constructive doubt, Bangstad (p. 
7) does with justification question my own omission of Mouffe and, by 
implication, Laclau too.  
 
But in such a well-informed and broad survey of the current ideological terrain 
of the European left, I would still have liked to see a direct scholarly engagement 
on Valluvan’s part with the work of the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, who in 
arguing for a left nationalist populism has also invoked the legacy Stuart Hall. It 
seems to me somewhat dishonest on Mouffe’s part to position her current work 
as preserving the legacy of the late Hall, given that Hall in his lifetime indicated 
very strongly and in his own writings that he had tired of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
discursive and metaphysical turn.  [But] given how influential that work has 
been for a certain strand of left nationalist populism that Valluvan is clearly 
opposed to, it would be eminently useful to have a more concrete engagement 
with it in Valluvan’s work: Laclau’s influential work on populism is not even 
mentioned herein. 
 
This is fairly put. Bhattacharyya extends this by weighing a set of unsettling 
questions about the possibility of mass politics that lives with ‘the shadow of 
nationalism’. As she puts it in her inimitable wording,  ‘What I fear is that the 
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terrain of politics is so deeply shaped by the histories and institutional 
formations of nationalism that even our best dreams of freedom contain the 
shadow of that other exclusionary logic’ (p. 1). Bhattacharyya centers here the 
profound risks intrinsic to doing popular politics, wherein she suggests that the 
risk of majoritarian authoritarianism inheres in any attempt to name the people 
as a collective vis-à-vis an ‘externalised’ malignant force (ideally understood as 
capital and its principal elite beneficiaries). But equally, and I think rightly, she 
also intimates that these risks cannot be escaped – to refuse these risks is to tend 
towards a quietism or splendid isolation free of fear but therein free of the mass 
possibility as well.  
 
There are many giving resonances here with Sita Balani’s (2019) virtuoso Verso 
essay as written in the heady run-up to the British general election, during which 
many a soul of a radical vintage rallied to the call of Labour Corbynism – 
canvassing thanklessly in the unforgiving winter in the feeble hope that another 
state, however compromised, was within tangible grasp. Balani brings forth in 
this essay a searching and always empathetic critique of certain radical 
tendencies, arguing that the battle on the fringes for a resolute political clarity 
and the parallel promise of ‘safety’ proves futile and even ephemeral when 
tasked with the vagaries of ‘doorsteps’ (as a proxy for the vagaries of the public, 
writ large) and when tasked with the not insignificant hope of forging a 
collective mass across all its messy contradictions, inconveniences and 
fragmentations.  
 
Balani’s moving piece helps clinch in a particularly salutary manner the critical 
thrust of this symposium. The broader interrogation that takes shape in the 
symposium is namely two-fold. First, uncomfortable but vital questions about 
imagining or defending the popular in spite of its tendency towards nativist 
capture; and second, what might this accordingly reveal as regards the character 
of contemporary political collectivism in a more general sense. Related to this is 
an underlying desire, in the face of today’s political cataclysm, for a more 
affirmative analysis to be realized – asking for an unpacking of the premises by 
which an alternative beyond nationalist consolidations might be glimpsed.  
 
The populist possibility? 
 
In order to engage more fully with these considerations, I first restate a basic 
précis of populism as advanced in the book (Valluvan, 2019: 60-67). It remains 
the case that a lazy invocation of the term populism is at times nothing less than 
a condescending, bien-pensant dismissal of those political positions that appear 
to be popular at any given moment – i.e. those ostensibly popular positions that 
fail to stage the wider affections of ‘moderation’ and/or class discernment. This 
rendition of the term populism as a mere pejorative frequently deployed by 
merchants of sanctimonious and often well-heeled ‘centrism’ is rightly worthy of 
all the criticism it meets.  
 
This caveat aside, I do still remain wary of the prevailing tendency of much 
punditry to read contemporary politics as constituting a populist moment. What 
I find frustrating, in agreement with the contributors, is that today’s ‘xenoracist’ 
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nationalisms are being badged by many a European thinker as simply populism. 
This is not helpful, as it denies the very substantive and often racialised 
exclusionary assertions typical of these nationalisms; and instead, it tends to see 
contemporary politics as simply some kind of anti-elite energy as sourced in a 
vague but diffuse discontent that is equally available across the political 
spectrum – be it right-wing xenophobia, anti-corruption centrism, or a revived 
left socialism.  
 
Indeed, it is worth noting that much of what is often conceptually ascribed to 
populism seems to me, by default, nationalism – given the ‘family resemblances’ 
between populism’s rousing appeal to ‘the people’ on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the long legacy of nationalism’s ability to already mediate how we 
intuitively understand any such appeal to the people and its constitutive Others. 
In more blunt terms, the appeal to the people that is considered central to 
populism is I believe already so heavily circumscribed by nationalism’s parochial 
chauvinism. In short, it is nation (as it operates through communitarian 
invocations of race, ethnicity and religion) that modernity has privileged as the 
basis by which to imagine and render political community. And this creates 
problems for any attempt at a populist invocation – of a ‘we and them’, ‘us 
against evil’, ‘the authentic versus the fraudulent’ – that is not reflective about 
this deep intertwining.  
 
It remains however true that any socialist inclined naming of a profiteering class 
against whom a majority might be named is not entirely dissimilar to the 
political templates characteristic of populism (Matthews, 2019). But here we 
might want to retain one feature of what is understood as populism but dispense 
with the other. Whilst the urge to summon a prospective mass against the 
‘externalisable enemy’ (Bhattacharyya: p. 4) might be to some extent 
unavoidable as regards a politics of class antagonism, it need not also accord 
with the levels of simplified reductionism (Farris, 2017: 133) also commonly 
ascribed to populism as a signature trait. Put differently, the imaginative work 
required for rethinking our intuitive conceptions of  ‘political community’, which 
currently retreats towards communitarian frameworks as tied to nation, will 
likely require a complexity and dreaming that is not easily reconciled with 
populism’s tendency towards crass simplification of the political equation.1  
 
Bhattacharyya’s spirited call for a critical complexity is accordingly vital here – 
one that does not balk at the challenges of forging an alternative collective but 
does not elide either the dangers that are intrinsic to such moments. The risks 
that racial and ethnic minorities face whenever a significant oppositional force 
take shape are well-documented, wherein their perspectives are summarily 
silenced and, worse yet, they are often seen as inconvenient presences upon 
whom an opportunist ire might be trained. Minorities are herein always exposed 
to the fickle munificence of the self-anointed majority; but Bhattacharyya scans 
various global contexts as a springboard to explore the terms by which 
                                                        
1 Any such complexity will also allow for a political acknowledgement that many people being 
appealed to by left populists often occupy rather ambivalent socioeconomic locations vis-à-vis 
capitalist moralities and distribution alike – and the challenges this accordingly poses to any 
attempt to rally a mass along a simplified sense of capitalist injustice and anti-‘elite’ rhetoric.   
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participation in such mass movements must still be entertained. I sense in 
Bhattacharyya’s contribution, when seen from the British perspective, an 
intimation that the many dangers and inadequacies of participation in say 
Corbynism, XR, trade unionism/workplace actions, door knocking, or even 
various pro-Remain campaigns, in spite of the latter’s often empty, often 
exclusive pretences of centrist ‘reasonableness’, are only superseded by the 
dangers of not participating.  As she says,  
 
Not everyone can take part and political activism is too dangerous for some. Of course 
we know that. What we say to each other less often is that non-participation in struggles 
that capture popular imagination can bring new dangers and violences (Bhattacharyya: 
p. 7, emphasis added). 
 
The more obvious of these dangers that obtain from ‘non-participation’ would 
seem to be the inevitable weakening of the broader critical mass that could 
otherwise take shape. Non-participation also constitutes a potential foregoing of 
the important opportunities to constructively influence in good faith any such 
popular opposition. But Bhattacharyya’s emphasis is also one that speaks to a 
darker fear as tied to the communitarian streak that is often latent in any such 
popular opposition – wherein non-participation also further exposes oneself to 
‘their’ cruel and often racialised indifference, becoming even a disposable target 
of the oppositional force’s resentful violence. There is a lot jockeying for 
attention in this sobering observation that does not invite easy answers and is 
best reserved for a longer and more searching conversation. But Bhattacharyya’s 
piece does in a more general sense help crystallise the serious challenges of 
identifying an externalisable antagonism against which to anchor a popular 
cause whilst also vigilantly guarding against its lapses to an exclusionary 
communitarian template.  
 
The ruptures of nationalism 
 
It is my belief, as regards the United Kingdom, that Corbynism did briefly hint at 
some of this wider mass-making maturity. Favell (p. 7) is admittedly right to 
caution against inferring too breezily, describing the surge in optimism as merely 
‘that 2017 moment’ which has hardly endured. The collective wake precipitated 
by the December 12 catastrophe would seem to vindicate his vigilance.  
 
The broader intimation of total failure is however I think too premature, 
whereby, as regards the staging of a substantial left alternative in Britain, 
Corbynism still constitutes a vital milestone. Corbynism was from its inception, a 
nigh accidental, always beleaguered, and, at times, anachronistically stubborn 
programme. Equally so, the disciplined Tory consolidation of the nationalist 
terrain as documented in CoN, was always bound to triumph against a scruffily 
assembled left politics – particularly when the election was itself insistently 
filtered through the Brexit impasse, an impasse scarcely conducive to a non-
nationalist left pivot. But Corbynism, at its best, did also represent a wider spirit 
of staking an alternative claim on the mass. This is no minor feat. In the raw 
immediacy of the electoral loss, it has been easy to forget that to even speak 
credibly of a left alternative is entirely without recent precedent. This is also an 
era when digital media circulation, which is particularly vulnerable to targeted 
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manipulation and voter suppression (Cadwalladr, 2020), and the wider siren call 
of the ‘distraction economy’ as serviced so plentifully by niche-casting culture 
industries, interact powerfully to induce apathy, resignation, and/or paralysing 
single-issue retreat. It is hereby particularly remarkable that a plucky attempt to 
raise a broad left-oriented political vehicle had any traction – the comprehensive 
support Labour won amongst under-50s being particularly encouraging here.  
 
And whilst these alternative-populars remain both nascent and for now 
chastened, a few speculations about the broader fault-lines that afflict today’s 
nationalism are also worth profiling – even if in the spirit of hope, and less so 
analytic confidence. Put simply, an acknowledgement of the contradictions that 
suffuse the nationalisms currently ascendant might also allow for a better sense 
of the alternative political formations that still vie for attention.  
 
First, recent trends in the UK, but also comparable developments elsewhere, 
have seen the formal right capitulate in full to ‘disaster nationalism’. As coined by 
the ever-insightful Richard Seymour (2019a), this amounts to the full messianic 
exhalation of nationalist panaceas, adventure and hubris irrespective of the 
governmental, economic and planetary pain and dysfunction it in actuality 
accelerates. Not too long ago, constitutive nationalist themes were essentially 
complementary to the right’s broader story of capitalist uplift, business 
evangelism, and small-state utopias. As argued in CoN, themes as regards 
historical heritage and cultural coherence, the scourge of immigration, and the 
villainy of generalized foreign entities such as the EU, ‘liberal internationalist’ 
institutions, or, of late, China, were all certainly visible. But they did not supplant 
the wider triumph of the right’s confident commitment to capitalist 
individualism, the meritocratic conceit, and the wider social mobility contract 
allied to it. Similarly, a small-business, shopkeeper ethos as aligned to union 
bashing, welfare shaming and austerity pragmatism still commanded the wider 
raison d'être of the mainstream right. The incremental drift however of its press 
and electoral strategy towards the nativist politics of nativist aversion and 
pathological nostalgia has gradually yielded what might in the UK be best 
described as the full ‘Faragisation’ of the right (Seymour, 2019b).  
 
This consolidation does admittedly seem unassailable – and particularly so when 
aided by the accentuated circulation economies of social/digital media. This 
being an economic imperative that privileges the ‘insomniac’ (Gilroy, 2019) 
energies of injured identity (the majoritarian form of which will always 
triumph), sensationalist alarmism (which is therein highly responsive to 
racialised scaremongering), and self-confirmatory looping (which therein pre-
emptively repudiates any possibilities of critique). This tendency is compounded 
by the wider discipline of the legacy press to zealously cheerlead any iteration of 
anti-left politics. It is within this context that, the world over, the right’s 
submission to an unadulterated nationalism has allowed to it rally the majorities 
sufficient to sustain power.  
 
But this is, crucially, a reconfigured hegemony. Insofar as, the right-populist 
capture is cast along a increasingly thin premise; or rather, it has overinvested in 
a nationalist prism and the wider ‘culture wars’ cognate to it as regards 
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race/anti-racism, gender/feminism, and even environmentalism/‘lifestyle’. 
Inversely, the partial vacating of a capitalist common-sense – which might be 
crudely summarised as the ‘fuck business’ asides that the current doyens of the 
right are not averse to – leaves indeed an ideological void that has seldom been 
present. After all, the 2019 General Election campaign saw very little that 
amounted to a conventional defence of capitalist virtue. Indeed, owing to such an 
audible silence, the Conservative electoral strategy might even be described as a 
non-campaign. Yes, the residual spectre of anti-communism red-smearing still 
does a remarkable amount of what at times seems to be rather anachronistic 
ideological work; but this remains only a politics of ‘resentment’ (Davies, 2019) 
and negation, as opposed to it affirming any textured capitalist commitment.  
 
And indeed, the right’s putative re-enchantment with the (white) ‘working class’ 
as the image in whose name it champions a nationalist mandate does yield 
certain complications to how it presents itself: as was, in fact, pressed quite 
effectively by the BBC’s Andrew Neil in the early hours of the election result. We 
have seen, in other words, a strange rehabilitation of the language of class, but 
one that empties it of any materialist, socioeconomic content. This rehabilitation 
has been proactively recycled by left-communitarian apologists, whose own 
understanding of class, having been underdeveloped, are promptly seduced by 
the right’s opportunistic claim to the working class as the site at which the ‘ur’ 
national subject, and its constitutive cultural discontents, can be most 
authentically located. This key trope certainly does an extraordinary amount of 
work for lending racial nationalism a politically edifying sense of injury, 
victimhood and frustrated dignity. And as Papadakis explains, the operational 
emphasis here is certainly on the ‘white’, it licensing a whole raft of other white-
entitlement premises. But it is also my hunch that the parallel appeal to ‘working 
class’ cannot be rendered wholly silent, acting only as an expedient placeholder. 
The contradictions of this appellation pose in turn certain not insignificant 
complications in terms of how it might harness its overtures to the wronged 
‘working class’ whilst also having to sustain core austerity, privatisation, low-tax 
and post-Brexit ‘shock doctrine’ policies. And notwithstanding the proverbial 
‘red-brown’ pivot that acts an ominous portend of how such a contradiction 




The radical reconstituting of the right is certainly not without very tangible 
consequences as regards our political discourse and the everyday violence it 
demands vis-à-vis migrants, domestic minorities and dissenters; but it also 
signals a certain ‘rupture’ (Seymour, 2019c) that was previously absent. This 
prospective void in the capitalist conceit is further compounded by the 
generational urgency finding its voice vis-à-vis climate breakdown. The 
eschatological immanence of climate breakdown will only be met with a 
transformation equal to that scale – allowing for the left in its more youthful 
guise to insist upon political agendas that finally jettison the illusory merits of 
triangulated moderation and market realism.  
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Similarly, the fact that the new working classes (broadly construed) are being 
forged in urban settings more receptive to sentiments of multiculture indicates a 
prospective green socialist politics more suspicious of nationalist invitations. 
Much has been already been said about the marked age spread regarding the 
recent general election. And I do caution in CoN against reading this as a cohort 
effect, as there are myriad life-course effects that can render a putatively 
progressive generation more receptive, in time, to a petty-bourgeois, provincial 
defensiveness. Nonetheless, these emergent generations (spanning the 18-49 
bracket) not only voted overwhelmingly for a Corbyn-led Labour, but it also does 
constitute a working class/lower middle-class that is less likely to encounter the 
forms of wealth mobility or socioeconomic stability as experienced by many of 
their older peers. For instance, this is a constituency who remains unable to 
access the property market and will likely remain asset-poor (Graeber, 2020); 
they are disastrously exposed to the ravages of rentier capitalism through 
housing but also student debt; they are no longer credibly strapped into anything 
resembling the social mobility contract; and they are also less able to find secure, 
permanent work, depending instead on transient positions as often structured 
by the platform economy. And amidst the embedding of these classed realities, 
particularly generative for me is these generations’ increased exposure to those 
urban settings and popular cultures where a relatively unfussy anti-nationalist 
temperament is not uncommon. 
 
Multiculture and post-nationalism  
 
These admittedly hopeful speculations as regards the formalisation of a non 
and/or post nationalist political inclination anticipates in turn the second critical 
angle that surfaces in the symposium. This being, in the words of Bangstad, the 
uses of ‘anthropology’ and, in the less flattering phrasing of Favell (p.3), a certain 
frustration with what he describes as the allegedly ‘literary theory’, ‘anti-
positivist’ inclination of those of us partial to postcolonial theory and cultural 
studies.  
 
Bangstad observes here how a current fashion for commentary on all things 
populist-nationalism has yet to yield a complementary commentary about how 
such ideological positions and anxieties actually land in the everyday, and across 
different locations.  
 
Valluvan’s intervention is also and admittedly one of theorizing. He does theorizing 
better and with more detail and nuance than most scholars in this contested field. It is of 
course a bit of a tired cliché by now, but as a social anthropologist by training, I 
sometimes find myself wanting to hear more of and from those attracted to and 
receptive to the messaging of nationalist populism, left or right. In as much as by now a 
considerable amount of scholarly thinking on the topic of ‘nationalist populism’ can be 
said to engage in a proverbial ‘violence of abstraction’, ethnographic works that explore 
the lifeworlds of ‘nationalist populists’ are still surprisingly few and far between 
(Bangstad: p.4).  
 
I admit that my own thinking does continue to be drawn into the particulars of 
ideological formation. But as Hall (1980), Williams (2019) and fellow-travellers 
always insisted, ideological production is only the obverse side of social 
formation, with the reverse being the terms by which such ideas and sentiments 
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are made to bear in local, quotidian settings and in ways that are not simply 
epiphenomenal of any preceding ideological interface.  
 
It was in fact with this consideration in mind that the conclusion to CoN 
entertained some more affirmative notes about the already-available 
multicultures that act as a lived resource that helps unsettle the overtures of 
nation. The symposium contributors are favorable to this attempt, with Bangstad 
drawing parallels with his ongoing research in Oslo East. Bhattacharyya (p.3) 
and Favell (pp. 9-10) do however also note some implicit dangers here. 
Principally, both explore in fascinating ways how a coopted account of 
multiculture could become a particularly seductive basis by which the remit of 
nation might be notionally enlarged but its underlying logic of exclusive 
belonging also fundamentally reinforced.  
 
A couple elaborations are herein warranted. First, I repeat here that I do not 
myself see this multiculture as a basis to widening the scope of belonging via 
which national identity can be made to cohere along more hospitable lines. I 
agree that this remains a false horizon – as a new politics of belonging is 
necessarily contingent to a new politics of non-belonging (this is indeed a fairly 
significant aspect of CoN’s Chapter 3 as regards liberal/‘civic’ nationalisms). It is 
rather that the realities of multiculture, and its intuitive normalization of 
difference and flux, acts for me as a stay on nationalist sensibilities – a stay on 
the appeal to nation as a cipher by which our political concerns can be unlocked. 
It is, in other words, an estrangement from the nation and communitarian 
belonging as the basis by which to narrate our political problems and by which 
to source our political redemption. It is not that the various renditions of 
communitarian identity fade into a happy oblivion, but rather, it ceases to 
exercise as meaningful a role in our capacities to inflect the political.  
 
As such, multiculture is also not for me a political template that might sustain a 
broader political ideal unmarked by capitalism, patriarchy, heteronormativity, 
and reaction more broadly. My objective is rather more modest here. Again, I 
appeal to multiculture as denoting only what I consider to be a useful 
deconstructive tendency vis-à-vis the explicitly communitarian casting of political 
desire (this being the expansive nation-state premise decisive in determining 
modernity vis-à-vis the political). Put differently, nationalism for me is the wider 
modern arc by which so much political thinking and desire is twinned intuitively 
to an assertion of the nation, and therein becomes preoccupied by the myriad 
anxieties as ascribed to the nation’s constitutive Others. Conversely, lived 
multiculture is for me the steady cementing of an everyday reflex that national 
identity holds no such solace and whose constitutive conceptions of the 
communitarian Other dissolve as being either irrelevant, contradictory and/or 
transparently reactionary. (Indeed, as Leddy-Owen (2019) recently argued in a 
close reading of contemporary Portsmouth, the idea of nation tends in fact to 
enjoy very little everyday salience – its abstracted and often metaphorical claims 
are more readily reserved for the realm of political discourse and ideology whilst 
having little cultural tangibility in the daily doings of local people).  
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More importantly, this concluding chapter tried to gesture at the possibilities of 
any such intuitive suspicion of nation to be scaled up in ways that might allow 
for broader geographic traction.  In other words, the concluding chapter of CoN 
attempted to point towards a more ambitious archiving of this everyday 
multiculture. This is an archiving and attendant circulation (after all, we 
increasingly live as much through YouTube and its analogues as we do any other 
space [James, 2020]) that might begin to offer our populations, including those 
who reside in more provincial settings, a respite from the satisfying clarity that 
national identity otherwise offers. 
 
I also passingly note that it a little hasty of Favell (p.10) to preemptively fear 
here an erasure of Eastern European migrants and their offspring from any such 
palimpsest consideration of multiculture’s inhabitations and histories. I agree 
that the rooting of Eastern Europeans across various British cities and towns 
does certainly help further destabilize the nationalist impulse to index 
conceptions of space, culture and political community to tidy taxonomies of race 
and ethnicity  (even if future passages of their young into a more normative, 
unmarked whiteness/Britishness does remain a complicating possibility [Fox 
and Mogilnicka, 2017]). After all, it is not uninteresting that in CoN it was David 
Vujacic that I briefly bracketed together with Big Narstie and Grime for Corbyn 
when thinking through the popular and unaffected reach of an commonplace 
multiculture-premised radicalism (Valluvan, 2019: 206). Similarly, having grown 
up in Stockholm, the significant Balkan-origin presence in those working-class 
spaces most immediate to me was of course formative for my own early attempts 
to think through a politically generative multiculture. 
 
As regards a wider purposing of multiculture, it is Papadakis’ energetic 
commentary that resonates particularly well – her symposium piece patiently 
undermining the particular cultural geographies that have become key to 
England’s own peculiar staging of earthy nativism. Papadakis outlines the terms 
by which the idea of ‘The North’ has obtained an iconic status amongst 
nationalist apologists. Where once it stood in the popular imagination for the 
sociopolitical consciousness as forged via the socialisms of a chartist, co-
operative, union, and vernacular variety,2 it is now rallied to convey an authentic 
subject in whom a politics of national retrenchment and ‘legitimate concerns’ 
(Penny, 2019) about the outsider are readily vested.  
 
Papadakis’ voice is accordingly crucial. Her doctoral research as profiled in her 
contribution is geared towards a reading of migration and ‘dispersion’ (p.3) that 
refuses the templates of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick 
Schiller, 2002) – i.e. forms of ostensibly intra-national migration from North-to-
South that cut therein across the symbolic geographies that contour Britain’s 
political mythology. Whilst careful not to flatten the uneven structural penalties 
and demagogueries faced by migrants as depending on other ethno-racial and 
class factors, Papadakis (pp. 5-6) shapes to prize open narrations of the 
Northerner’s experience in ways that might invite a wider ‘migrant city’ (Back et 
                                                        
2 Though, as Papadakis rightly reminds us, these Northern areas were also shaped by an 
industrial wealth that was of course contingent on its centripetal location as regards imperial 
economies. 
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al., 2018) solidarity and/or anti-national political personality. Her approach is, in 
other words, an estranging device that aims to relocate the Northerner outside of 
the insistent claim to English/British nationhood that otherwise prevails. It 
instead looks to tie the Northerner enduring late capitalist London life to the 
‘working-class cosmopolitanisms’ (Rogaly, forthcoming) as already available in 
both residual and emergent registers. Such vital work helps challenge herein the 
reheated confidence of Blue Labour and its peers, who tout their communitarian 
nostrum as the only means to rescue a social democratic politics that might 
plausibly command working-class appeal. Instead, by drawing upon the 
canonical theorization of Avtar Brah (1996), Papadakis adds to the wider 
catalogue of ethnographic work that refuses to accept the badge of ‘social 
conservatism’ (popularly construed as the politics of ‘flag, faith and family’) that 
our intelligentsia would have us believe is the permanent and unique province of 
the working classes.  
 
And whilst so very much has been already said about the dangers of the left 
communitarian position, I reiterate that the casting of the provincial working 
class as the engine room of nationalist politics is to traffic in a series of 
dangerous analytic errors. It elides other equally if not more numerable 
demographics that carry the cause of Tory nationalism; it summarily ignores the 
disproportionate working-class location of migrant and minority constituencies; 
it assumes the electoral North as synonymous with working class when in fact 
the class profile of those in the Midlands and North voting for the Johnson 
iteration of Brexit rapture is rather more complex (see particularly the class 
location of those older voters turning right); and also, and perhaps most fatally, it 
risks tautologically preempting its own thesis. As regards the latter, in assuming 
that working-class voters are by constitution socially conservative, a defeatist 
premise that that ‘twas ever thus’ and shall always remain so is prematurely 
conceded.  
 
In conclusion, it seems to me that a helpful sociological stance is to try to press 
against this insistent fatalism via a different documenting of lives as they are 
already lived, and indeed, have been lived. The objective here is bring through 
the already available cultural common-senses and histories that speak to the 
prosaic inhabiting of difference and even internationalism but in ways that can 
also locate such everyday realities amidst the provincial, the town, and ‘the 
North’. Whilst the nationalisms that presently ravage us can be derided as being 
hateful but also illusory vis-à-vis the problems they pretend to solve, equally vital 
is the small matter of offering people a different repertoire through which to 
make sense of their lives and through which to narrate their experiences. The 
sociological sensibilities that might attest to these deep archives of multiculture 




Back, L. and Sinha, S. with Bryan, C., Baraku, V., and Yemba, M. (2018) Migrant 
City, London: Routledge 
 
 12 
Balani, S. (2019) ‘Dangerous Spaces’, Verso Blogs, December 11, 
https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4518-dangerous-spaces 
 
Brah, A. (1996) Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities, London: 
Routledge 
 
Cadwalladr, C. (2020) ‘Fresh Cambridge Analytica leak “shows global 




Davies, W.  (2019) ‘The Tories have lost their ideology. Now they are merely the 




Farris, S. (2017) In the Name of Women’s Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press 
 
Fassin, E. (2019) Populism Left and Right, Chicago, IL: Prickly Paradigm Press 
 
Gilroy, P. (2019) ‘Never Again: Refusing race and salvaging the human’, New 
Frame, June 20, https://www.newframe.com/long-read-refusing-race-and-
salvaging-the-human/ 
 
Graeber, D. (2020) ‘The center blows itself up: Care and spite in the “Brexit 




Hall, S. (1973) ‘Encoding/decoding’ in Hall, S., Hobson, D., Lowe, A. and Willis, P. 
(Eds.) Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79’, 
London: Routledge, 117-127  
 
James, M. (2020) Sonic Intimacy, London: Bloomsbury 
 
Leddy-Owen, C. (2019) Nationalism, Inequality and England’s Political 
Predicament, London: Routledge 
 
Matthews, J. (2019) ‘Populism, inequality and representation: Negotiating “the 
99%” with Occupy London’, Sociological Review, 67:15, 1018-1033 
 
Penny, E. (2019) ‘Legitimate Concerns’, Verso Blogs, December 20, 
https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4538-legitimate-concerns 
 
Rogaly, B. (forthcoming) Stories from a Migrant City: Non-elite Cosmopolitanism 
and Provincial Urban Citizenship, Manchester: Manchester University Press 
 
 13 
Seymour, R. (2019a) ‘We were crushed by disaster nationalism’, Patreon.com, 
December 26, https://www.patreon.com/posts/we-were-crushed-32633194? 
 
Seymour, R. (2019b) ‘A dark appetite for adventure is driving Britain’s hardline 




Seymour, R. (2019c) ‘Rupture on the right’, Patreon.com, December 30, 
https://www.patreon.com/posts/rupture-on-right-32717023? 
 
Valluvan, S. (2019) The Clamour of Nationalism, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press 
 
Williams, R. (2019) ‘Popular Culture in Thatcher’s Britain: Didier Eribon 




Wimmer, A. and Glick Schiller, N. (2002) ‘Methodological nationalism and 
beyond’, Global Networks, 2:4, 301-334 
 
 
 
